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Abstract
Background: On 11 June the World Health Organization officially raised the phase of pandemic
alert (with regard to the new H1N1 influenza strain) to level 6. As of 19 July, 137,232 cases of the
H1N1 influenza strain have been officially confirmed in 142 different countries, and the pandemic
unfolding in the Southern hemisphere is now under scrutiny to gain insights about the next winter
wave in the Northern hemisphere. A major challenge is pre-empted by the need to estimate the
transmission potential of the virus and to assess its dependence on seasonality aspects in order to
be able to use numerical models capable of projecting the spatiotemporal pattern of the pandemic.
Methods: In the present work, we use a global structured metapopulation model integrating
mobility and transportation data worldwide. The model considers data on 3,362 subpopulations in
220 different countries and individual mobility across them. The model generates stochastic
realizations of the epidemic evolution worldwide considering 6 billion individuals, from which we
can gather information such as prevalence, morbidity, number of secondary cases and number and
date of imported cases for each subpopulation, all with a time resolution of 1 day. In order to
estimate the transmission potential and the relevant model parameters we used the data on the
chronology of the 2009 novel influenza A(H1N1). The method is based on the maximum likelihood
analysis of the arrival time distribution generated by the model in 12 countries seeded by Mexico
by using 1 million computationally simulated epidemics. An extended chronology including 93
countries worldwide seeded before 18 June was used to ascertain the seasonality effects.
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Results: We found the best estimate R0 = 1.75 (95% confidence interval (CI) 1.64 to 1.88) for the
basic reproductive number. Correlation analysis allows the selection of the most probable seasonal
behavior based on the observed pattern, leading to the identification of plausible scenarios for the
future unfolding of the pandemic and the estimate of pandemic activity peaks in the different
hemispheres. We provide estimates for the number of hospitalizations and the attack rate for the
next wave as well as an extensive sensitivity analysis on the disease parameter values. We also
studied the effect of systematic therapeutic use of antiviral drugs on the epidemic timeline.
Conclusion: The analysis shows the potential for an early epidemic peak occurring in October/
November in the Northern hemisphere, likely before large-scale vaccination campaigns could be
carried out. The baseline results refer to a worst-case scenario in which additional mitigation
policies are not considered. We suggest that the planning of additional mitigation policies such as
systematic antiviral treatments might be the key to delay the activity peak in order to restore the
effectiveness of the vaccination programs.
Background
Estimating the transmission potential of a newly emerg-
ing virus is crucial when planning for adequate public
health interventions to mitigate its spread and impact,
and to forecast the expected epidemic scenarios through
sophisticate computational approaches [1-4]. With the
current outbreak of the new influenza A(H1N1) strain
having reached pandemic proportions, the investigation
of the influenza situation worldwide might provide the
key to the understanding of the transmissibility observed
in different regions and to the characterization of possible
seasonal behavior. During the early phase of an outbreak,
this task is hampered by inaccuracies and incompleteness
of available information. Reporting is constrained by the
difficulties in confirming large numbers of cases through
specific tests and serological analysis. The cocirculation of
multiple strains, the presence of asymptomatic cases that
go undetected, the impossibility to monitor mild cases
that do not seek health care and the possible delays in
diagnosis and reporting, all worsen the situation. Early
modeling approaches and statistical analysis show that
the number of confirmed cases by the Mexican authorities
during the early phase was underestimated by a factor
ranging from one order of magnitude [5] to almost three
[6]. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the US esti-
mate a 5% to 10% case detection, similar to other coun-
tries facing large outbreaks, with expected heterogeneities
due to different surveillance systems. Even within the
same country, the setup of enhanced monitoring led to
improved notification with respect to the earlier phase of
the pandemic, later relaxed as reporting requirements
changed [7].
By contrast, the effort put in place by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and health protection agencies
worldwide is providing an unprecedented amount of data
and, at last, the possibility of following in real time the
pandemic chronology on the global scale. In particular,
the border controls and the enhanced surveillance aimed
at detecting the first cases reaching uninfected countries
appear to provide more reliable and timely information
with respect to the raw count of cases as local transmission
occurs, and this data has already been used for early
assessment of the number of cases in Mexico [5]. Moreo-
ver, data on international passenger flows from Mexico
was found to display a strong correlation with confirmed
H1N1 importations from Mexico [8]. Here we present an
estimate of the reproduction number, R0, (that is, the
average number of secondary cases produced by a primary
case [9]) of the current H1N1 epidemic based on knowl-
edge of human mobility patterns. We use the GLEaM (for
GLobal Epidemic and Mobility) structured metapopula-
tion model [10] for the worldwide evolution of the pan-
demic and perform a maximum likelihood analysis of the
parameters against the actual chronology of newly
infected countries. The method is computationally inten-
sive as it involves a Monte Carlo generation of the distri-
bution of arrival time of the infection in each country
based on the analysis of 106 worldwide simulations of the
pandemic evolution with the GLEaM model. The method
shifts the burden of estimating the disease transmissibility
from the incidence data, suffering notification/surveil-
lance biases and dependent on country specific surveil-
lance systems, to the more accurate data of the early case
detection in newly affected countries. This is achieved
through the modeling of human mobility patterns on the
global level obtained from high quality databases. In
other words, the chronology of the infection of new coun-
tries is determined by two factors. The first is the number
of cases generated by the epidemic in the originating
country. The second is the mobility of people from this
country to the rest of the world. The mobility data are
defined from the outset with great accuracy and we can
therefore find the parameters of the disease spreading as
those that provide the best fit for the time of infection of
new countries. This method also allows for uncovering
the presence of a seasonal signature in the observed pat-
tern, not hindered or effectively caused by notificationBMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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and reporting changes in each country's influenza moni-
toring. The obtained values for the reproduction numbers
are larger than the early estimates [5], though aligned with
later works [11-13]. The simulated geographic and tempo-
ral evolution of the pandemic based on these estimates
shows the possibility of an early  epidemic activity peak in
the Northern hemisphere as soon as mid October. While
the simulations refer to a worst-case scenario, with no
intervention implemented, the present findings pertain to
the timing of the vaccination campaigns as planned by
many countries. For this reason we also present an analy-
sis of scenarios in which the systematic use of antiviral
drug therapy is implemented with varying effectiveness,
according to the national stockpiles, and study their effect
on the epidemic timeline.
Methods
The GLEaM structured metapopulation model is based on
a metapopulation approach [4,14-22] in which the world
is divided into geographical regions defining a subpopu-
lation network where connections among subpopulations
represent the individual fluxes due to the transportation
and mobility infrastructure. GLEaM integrates three differ-
ent data layers [10]. The population layer is based on the
high-resolution population database of the 'Gridded Pop-
ulation of the World' project of the SocioEconomic Data
and Applications Center (SEDAC) [23] that estimates the
population with a granularity given by a lattice of cells
covering the whole planet at a resolution of 15 × 15 min-
utes of arc. The transportation mobility layer integrates air
travel mobility obtained from the International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA [24]) and Official Airline Guide
(OAG [25]) databases that contain the list of worldwide
airport pairs connected by direct flights and the number of
available seats on any given connection [26]. The combi-
nation of the population and mobility layers allows the
subdivision of the world into georeferenced census areas
defined with a Voronoi tessellation procedure [27]
around transportation hubs. These census areas define the
subpopulations of the metapopulation modeling struc-
ture (see Figure 1). In particular, we identify 3,362 sub-
populations centered around IATA airports in 220
different countries (see [10] and Additional file 1 for more
details). GLEaM integrates short scale mobility between
adjacent subpopulations by considering commuting pat-
terns worldwide as obtained from the data collected and
analyzed from more than 29 countries in 5 continents
across the world [10]. Superimposed on these layers is the
epidemic layer that defines the disease and population
dynamics. The model simulates the mobility of individu-
als from one subpopulation to another by a stochastic
procedure in which the number of passengers of each
compartment traveling from a subpopulation j to a sub-
population l is an integer random variable defined by the
actual data from the airline transportation database (see
Additional file 1). Short range commuting between sub-
populations is modeled with a time scale separation
approach that defines the effective force of infections in
connected subpopulations [10,28,29]. The infection
dynamics takes place within each subpopulation and
assumes the classic influenza-like illness compartmentali-
zation in which each individual is classified by a discrete
state such as susceptible, latent, infectious symptomatic,
infectious asymptomatic or permanently recovered/
removed [9,30]. The model therefore assumes that the
latent period is equivalent to the incubation period and
that no secondary transmissions occur during the incuba-
tion period (see Figure 1 for a detailed description of the
compartmentalization). All transitions are modeled
through binomial and multinomial processes to preserve
the discrete and stochastic nature of the processes (see
Additional file 1 for the full description). Asymptomatic
individuals are considered as a fraction pa = 33% of the
infectious individuals [31] generated in the model and
assumed to infect with a relative infectiousness of rβ =
50% [5,30,32]. Change in traveling behavior after the
onset of symptoms is modeled with the probability 1 - pt,
set to 50%, that individuals would stop traveling when ill
[30]. The spreading rate of the disease is ultimately gov-
erned by the basic reproduction number R0. Once the dis-
ease parameters and initial conditions based on available
data are defined, GLEaM allows the generation of stochas-
tic realizations of the worldwide unfolding of the epi-
demic, with mobility processes entirely based on real
data. The model generates in silico epidemics for which we
can gather information such as prevalence, morbidity,
number of secondary cases, number of imported cases
and other quantities for each subpopulation and with a
time resolution of 1 day. While global models are gener-
ally used to produce scenarios in which the basic disease
parameters are defined from the outset, here we use the
model to provide a maximum likelihood estimate of the
transmission potential by finding the set of disease
parameters that best fit the data on the arrival time of
cases in different countries worldwide. It is important to
stress that the model is not an agent-based model and
does not include additional structure within a subpopula-
tion, therefore it cannot provide detailed information at
the level of households or workplaces. The projections for
the winter season in the northern hemisphere are also
assuming that there will be no mutation of the virus with
respect to the spring/summer of 2009. Furthermore, while
at the moment the novel H1N1 influenza is accounting
for 75% of the influenza cases worldwide, the model does
not consider the cocirculation of different influenza
strains and cannot provide information on cocirculation
data.
The initial conditions of the epidemic are defined by set-
ting the onset of the outbreak near La Gloria in Mexico onBMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
Page 4 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
18 February 2009, as reported by official sources [33] and
analogously to other works [5]. We tested different locali-
zations of the first cases in census areas close to La Gloria
without observing relevant variations with respect to the
observed results. We also performed sensitivity analysis
on the starting date by selecting a seeding date anticipated
or delayed by 1 week with respect to the date available in
official reports [33]. The arrival time of infected individu-
als in the countries seeded by Mexico is clearly a combina-
tion of the number of cases present in the originating
country (Mexico) and the mobility network, both within
Mexico and connecting Mexico with countries abroad. For
this reason we integrated into our model the data on Mex-
ico-US border commuting (see Figure 2a), which could be
relevant in defining the importation of cases in the US,
along with Mexican internal commuting patterns (see Fig-
ure 1) that are responsible for the diffusion of the disease
from rural areas as La Gloria to transportation hubs such
as Mexico City. In addition, we used a time-dependent
modification of the reproductive number in Mexico as in
[6] to model the control measures implemented in the
country starting 24 April and ending 10 May, as those
might affect the spread to other countries.
In order to ascertain the effect of seasonality on the
observed pattern, we explored different seasonality
Schematic illustration of the GLobal Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM) model Figure 1
Schematic illustration of the GLobal Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM) model. Top: census and mobility layers that 
define the subpopulations and the various types of mobility among those (commuting patterns and air travel flows). The same 
resolution is used worldwide. Bottom: compartmental structure in each subpopulation. A susceptible individual in contact with 
a symptomatic or asymptomatic infectious person contracts the infection at rate β or rββ [30,32], respectively, and enters the 
latent compartment where he is infected but not yet infectious. At the end of the latency period, each latent individual 
becomes infectious, entering the symptomatic compartments with probability 1 - pa or becoming asymptomatic with probabil-
ity pa [30,32]. The symptomatic cases are further divided between those who are allowed to travel (with probability pt) and 
those who would stop traveling when ill (with probability 1 - pt) [30]. Infectious individuals recover permanently with rate μ. 
All transition processes are modeled through multinomial processes.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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schemes. The seasonality is modeled by a standard forcing
that rescales the value of the basic reproductive number
into a seasonally rescaled reproductive number, R(t),
depending on time. The seasonal rescaling is time and
location dependent by means of a scaling multiplicative
factor generated by a sinusoidal function with a total
period of 12 months oscillating in the range αmin to αmax,
with αmax = 1.1 days (sensitivity analysis in the range 1.0
to 1.1) and αmin a free parameter to be estimated [17]. The
rescaling function is in opposition in the Northern and
Southern hemispheres (see Additional file 1 for details).
No rescaling is assumed in the Tropics. The value of R0
reported in the Tables and the definition of the baseline is
the reference value in the Tropics. In each subpopulation
the R(t) relative to the corresponding geographical loca-
tion and time of the year is used in the simulations.
The seasonal transmission potential of the H1N1 strain is
assessed in a two-step process that first estimates the
reproductive number in the Tropics region, where season-
ality is assumed not to occur, by focusing on the early
international seeding by Mexico, and then estimates the
degree of seasonal dumping factor by examining a longer
time period of international spread to allow for seasonal
changes. The estimation of the reproductive number is
performed through a maximum likelihood analysis of the
model fitting the data of the early chronology of the
H1N1 epidemic. Given a set of values of the disease
parameters, we produced 2 × 103 stochastic realizations of
the pandemic evolution worldwide for each R0 value. Our
model explicitly takes into account the class of sympto-
matic and asymptomatic individuals (see Figure 1) and
allows the tracking of the importation of each sympto-
matic individual and of the onset of symptoms of exposed
individuals transitioning to the symptomatic class, as
observables of the simulations. This allows us to obtain
numerically with a Monte Carlo procedure the probability
distribution Pi(ti) of the importation of the first infected
Illustration of the model's initialization and the results for the activity peaks in three geographical areas Figure 2
Illustration of the model's initialization and the results for the activity peaks in three geographical areas. (a) 
Intensity of the commuting between US and Mexico at the border of the two countries. (b) The 12 countries infected from 
Mexico used in the Monte Carlo likelihood analysis. The color scale of the arrows from red to yellow indicates the time order-
ing of the epidemic invasion. Panels (c), (d) and (e) show the daily incidence in Lower South America, South Pacific and North 
America/Western Europe, respectively. The shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval (CI) of the peak time in the cor-
responding geographical region. The median incidence profiles of selected countries are shown for the two values defining the 
best-fit seasonality scaling factor interval.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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individual or the first occurrence of the onset of symp-
toms for an individual in each country i at time ti. Asymp-
tomatic individuals do not contribute to the definition of
ti. With the aim of working with conditional independent
variables we restrict the likelihood analysis to 12 countries
seeded from Mexico (see Figure 2b) and for which it is
possible to know with good confidence the onset of symp-
toms and/or the arrival date of the first detected case (see
Tables and data sources in Additional file 1). This allows
us to define a likelihood function L = Πi Pi(ti*), where ti*
is the empirical arrival time from the H1N1 chronological
history in each of the selected countries. This methodol-
ogy assumes the prompt detection of symptomatic cases
at the very beginning of the outbreak in a given country,
and for this reason we have also provided a sensitivity
analysis accounting for a late/missed detection of sympto-
matic individuals as reported in the next section. The
transmission potential is estimated as the value of R0 that
maximizes the likelihood function L, for a given set of val-
ues of the disease parameters. In Table 1 we report the ref-
erence values assumed for some of the model parameters
and the range explored with the sensitivity analysis. So far
there are no precise clinical estimates of the basic model
parameters ε and μ defining the inverse average exposed
and infectious time durations [34-36]. The generation
interval Gt [37,38] used in the literature is based on the
early estimate of [5] and values obtained for previous pan-
demic and seasonal influenza [4,30-32,39,40], with most
studies focusing on values ranging from 2 to 4 days [5,11-
13]. We have therefore assumed a short exposed period
value ε-1 = 1.1 as indicated by early estimates [5] and com-
patible with recent studies on seasonal influenza [31,41]
and performed a sensitivity analysis for values as large as
ε-1 = 2.5 days. The maximum likelihood procedure is per-
formed by systematically exploring different values of the
generation time aimed at providing a best estimate and
confidence interval for Gt, along with the estimation of
the maximum likelihood value of R0.
The major problem in the case of projections on an
extended time horizon is the seasonality effect that in the
long run is crucial in determining the peak of the epi-
demic. In order to quantify the degree of seasonality
observed in the current epidemic, we estimate the mini-
mum seasonality scaling factor αmin of the sinusoidal forc-
ing by extending the chronology under study and
analyzing the whole data set composed of the arrival dates
of the first infected case in the 93 countries affected by the
outbreak as of 18 June. We studied the correlation
between the simulated arrival time by country and its cor-
responding empirical value, by measuring the regression
coefficient between the two datasets. Given the extended
time frame under observation, the arrival times consid-
ered in this case are expected to provide a signature of the
presence of seasonality. They included the seeding of new
countries from outbreaks taking place in regions where
seasonal effects might occur, as for example in the US or
in the UK. For the simulated arrival times we have consid-
ered the median and 95% confidence interval (CI) emerg-
ing from the 2 × 103  stochastic runs. The regression
coefficient is found to be sensitive to variations in the sea-
sonality scaling factor, allowing discrimination of the αmin
value that best fits the real epidemic. A detailed presenta-
tion of this analysis is reported in Additional file 1. The
full exploration of the phase space of epidemic parameters
and seasonality scenarios reported in Additional file 1
required data from 106 simulations; the equivalent of 2
million minutes of PowerPC 970 2.5 GHz CPU time.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 reports the results of the maximum likelihood
procedure and of the correlation analysis on the arrival
times for the estimation of αmin. In the following we con-
sider as the baseline case the set of parameters defined by
the best estimates: Gt = 3.6 days, μ-1 = 2.5 days, R0 = 1.75.
The best estimates for Gt and R0 are higher than those
obtained in early findings but close to subsequent analysis
on local outbreaks [11-13]. The R0 we report is the refer-
Table 1: Best Estimates of the epidemiological parameters
Parameter Best Estimate Interval estimate(a) Description
R0 1.75 1.64 to 1.88 Basic reproduction number
Gt 3.6 2.2 to 5.1 Mean generation time (days)
μ-1 2.5 1.1 to 4.0 Mean infectious period (days)
αmin 0.65 0.6 to 0.7 Minimal seasonality rescaling
Assumed values:
Assumed value at best estimate Sensitivity analysis range
ε-1 1.1 1.1 to 2.5 Mean exposed period (days)
αmax 1.1 1.0 to 1.1 Maximum seasonality rescaling
Estimates from the Monte Carlo likelihood analyses for various values of the parameter space explored. In Additional file 1 we report the complete 
tables corresponding to the sensitivity analysis. (a) For R0, we report the 95% Confidence Interval. Gt, μ-1 intervals are defined by the range of 
plausible constrained values sampled in the Monte Carlo approach that satisfy a likelihood ratio test at the 5% level. The αmin interval is the best-fit 
range within the minimal resolution allowed by the Monte Carlo sampling.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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ence value for Mexico and the tropical region, whereas in
each country we have to consider the R(t) due to the sea-
sonality rescaling depending on the time of the year, as
shown in Table 2. This might explain the lower values
found in some early analysis in the US. The transmission
potential emerging from our analysis is close to estimates
for previous pandemics [14,42]. In Additional file 1 we
provide supplementary tables for the full sensitivity anal-
ysis concerning the assumptions used in the model.
Results show that larger values of the generation interval
provide increasing estimates for R0. Fixing the latency
period to ε-1 = 1.1 days and varying the mean infectious
period in the plausible range 1.1 to 4.0 days yields corre-
sponding maximum likelihood estimates for R0 in the
range 1.4 to 2.1. Variations in the latency period from ε-1
= 1.1 to ε-1 = 2.5 days provide corresponding best esti-
mates for R0 in the range 1.9 to 2.3, if we assume an infec-
tious period of 3 days. We tested variations of the
compartmental model parameters pa, and pt up to 20%
and explored the range rβ = 20% to 80%, and sensitivity
on the value of the maximum seasonality scaling factor
αmax in the range 1.0 to 1.1. The obtained estimates lie
within the confidence intervals of the best estimate values.
The empirical arrival time data used for the likelihood
analysis are necessarily an overestimation of the actual
date of the importation of cases as cases could go undetec-
ted. If we assume a shift of 7 days earlier for all arrival
times available from official reports, the resulting maxi-
mum likelihood is increasing the best estimate for R0 to
1.87 (95% CI 1.73 to 2.01), as expected since earlier case
importation necessitates a larger growth rate of the epi-
demic. The official timeline used here therefore provides,
all other parameters being equal, a lower estimate of the
transmission potential. We have also explored the use of
a subset of the 12 countries, always generating results
within the confidence interval of the best estimate.
The best estimates reported in Table 1 do not show any
observable dependence on the assumption about the sea-
sonality scenario (as reported in Additional file 1). The
analysis is restricted to the first countries seeded from
Mexico to preserve the conditional independence of the
variables and it is natural to see the lack of any seasonal
signature since these countries receive the disease from a
single country, mostly found in the tropical region where
no seasonal effects are expected.
In order to find the minimum seasonality scaling factor
αmin that best fits the empirical data, we performed a sta-
tistical correlation analysis of the arrival time of the infec-
tion in the 93 countries infected as of 18 June, as detailed
in the Methods section and Additional file 1. By consider-
ing a larger number of countries and a longer period for
the unfolding of the epidemic worldwide as seasons
change, the correlation analysis for the baseline scenario
provides clear statistical indications for a minimum res-
caling factor in the interval 0.6 < αmin < 0.7. In the full
range of epidemic parameters explored, the correlation
analysis yields values for αmin in the range 0.4 to 0.9. This
evidence for a mild seasonality rescaling is consistent with
the activity observed in the months of June and July in
Europe and the US where the epidemic progression has
not stopped and the number of cases keeps increasing
considerably (see also Table 2 for the corresponding val-
ues of R(t) in those regions during summer months).
This analysis allows us to provide a comparison with the
epidemic activity observed so far, and most importantly
an early assessment of the future unfolding of the epidem-
ics. For each set of parameters the model generates quan-
tities of interest such as the profile of the epidemic
behavior in each subpopulation or the number of
imported cases. Each simulation generates a stochastic
realization of the process and the curves are the statistical
aggregate of at least 2 × 103 realizations. In the following
we report the median profiles and where indicated the
95% CI. For the sake of clarity data are aggregated at the
level of country or geographical region. Additional file 1
reports a detailed comparison of the simulated number of
cases in Australia, US, UK with the reported cases from
official sources in the period May to July. Results are in
good agreement with the reported temporal evolution of
the epidemic and highlight a progressive decrease of the
monitoring activity caused by the increasing number of
cases, as expected [7]. The same information is also avail-
able for each single subpopulation defined in the model.
We have therefore tested the model results in four territo-
ries of Australia. Interestingly, the model is able to recover
the different timing observed in the four territories. A
detailed discussion of this comparison is reported in
Additional file 1.
In Figure 2c-d we report the predicted baseline case pro-
files for countries in the Southern hemisphere. It is possi-
Table 2: Seasonality time-dependent reproduction number in 
the Northern hemisphere
Month R(t) in Northern hemisphere
May 1.19 to 1.49
June 1.07 to 1.33
July 1.05 to 1.24
August 1.07 to 1.33
September 1.19 to 1.49
The values of R(t) for the Northern hemisphere correspond to the 
rescaling of the maximum likelihood value of R0 in Mexico and in the 
Tropical regions (R0 = 1.75) and the best values for the seasonality 
rescaling factor, 0.6 < αmin < 0.7. The parameter αmin indicates the 
minimum value of the seasonal rescaling of R0 induced by the 
sinusoidal forcing in the Northern hemisphere [17].BMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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ble to observe in the figure that in this case, the effect of
seasonality is not discriminating between different waves,
as the short time interval from the start of the outbreak to
the winter season in the Southern hemisphere does not
allow a large variation in the rescaling of the transmissibil-
ity during these months. Therefore we predict a first wave
that occurs between August and September in phase with
the seasonal influenza pattern, and independently of the
seasonality parameter αmin. The situation is expected to be
different in the Northern hemisphere where different sea-
sonality parameters might progressively shift the peak of
the epidemic activity in the winter months. Figure 2e
reports the predicted daily incidence profiles for the
Northern hemisphere and the 95% CI for the activity
peaks of the pandemic with the best-fit seasonality sce-
nario (that is, the range 0.6 < αmin < 0.7). Table 3 reports
the same information for different continental areas. The
general evidence clearly points to the occurrence of an
autumn/winter wave in the Northern hemisphere strik-
ingly earlier than expected, with peak times ranging from
early October to the middle of November. The peak esti-
mate for each geographical area is obtained from the epi-
demic profile summing up all subpopulations belonging
to the region. The activity peak estimate for each single
country can be noticeably different from the overall esti-
mate of the corresponding geographical region as more
populated areas may dominate the estimate for a given
area. For instance Chile has a pandemic activity peak in
the interval 1 July - 6 August, one month earlier than the
average peak estimate for the Lower South America geo-
graphical area it belongs to. It is extremely important to
remark that in the whole phase space of parameters
explored the peak time for the epidemic activity in the
Northern hemisphere lies in the range late September to
late November, thus suggesting that the early seasonal
peak is a genuine feature induced by the epidemic data
available so far.
In Table 4 we report the new number of cases at the activ-
ity peak and the epidemic size as of 15 October for a
selected number of countries. As shown by the results in
the table, the implementation of a massive vaccination
campaign starting in October or November, with no addi-
tional mitigation implemented, would be too late with
respect to the epidemic evolution, and could therefore be
expected to be rather ineffective in reducing transmission.
This makes a strong case for prioritized vaccination pro-
grams focusing on high-risk groups and healthcare and
social infrastructure workers. In order to assess the
amount of pressure on the healthcare infrastructure, in
Table 5 we provide the expected number of hospitaliza-
tions at the epidemic peak according to different hospital-
ization rate estimates. The assessment of the
hospitalization rate is very difficult as it depends on the
ratio between the number of hospitalizations and the
actual number of infected people. As discussed previously,
the number of confirmed cases released by official agen-
cies is always a crude underestimate of the actual number
of infected people. We consider three different methods
along the lines of those developed for the analysis of fatal-
ities due to the new virus [43]. The first assumes the aver-
age value of hospitalization observed during the regular
seasonal influenza season. The second is a multiplier
method in which the hospitalization rate is obtained as
the ratio between the WHO number of confirmed hospi-
talizations and the cases confirmed by the WHO multi-
plied by a factor 10 to 30 to account for underreporting.
The third method is given by the ratio of the total number
of confirmed hospitalizations and the total number of
confirmed cases. This number is surely a gross overestima-
tion of the hospitalization rate [43,44]. It has to be noted
that hospitalizations are often related to existing health
conditions, age and other risk factors. This implies that
hospitalizations will likely not affect the population
homogenously, a factor that we cannot consider in our
model.
The number of hospitalized at peak times in the selected
countries range between 2 and 40 per 100,000 persons,
for a hospitalization rate typical of seasonal influenza and
for an assumed 1% rate, respectively, yielding a quantita-
tive indication of the potential burden that the health care
systems will likely face at the peak of the epidemic activity
in the next few months. It is worth noting that the present
analysis considers a worst-case scenario in which no effec-
tive containment measures are introduced. This is surely
not the case in that pandemic plans and mitigation strate-
gies are considered at the national and international level.
Guidelines aimed at increasing social distancing and the
isolation of cases will be crucial in trying to mitigate and
Table 3: Peak times
Region Estimated activity peak time
North America 25 September to 9 November
Western Europe 14 October to 21 November
Lower South America 30 July to 6 September
South Pacific 28 July to 17 September
The table reports the 95% confidence interval (CI) for the pandemic 
activity peak time for geographical areas in the Northern and 
Southern hemispheres estimated for the best-fit seasonality scaling 
interval, 0.6 < αmin < 0.7, and for the maximum likelihood value of R0 
found for the baseline parameters, R0 = 1.75. The confidence interval 
is obtained from the set of numerical observations of the peak time in 
a given region obtained from the 2,000 stochastic runs of the model. 
In Additional file 1 we report the results for the full sensitivity 
analysis. In all cases we obtain activity peak time intervals close to 
those reported for the baseline scenario. Peak time estimates in this 
table are obtained from the epidemic profile of the entire 
geographical region. Single country belonging to each region could 
have different peak time estimates (see text).BMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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delay the spread in the community, thus reducing the
overwhelming requests on the hospital systems. Most
importantly, the mass vaccination of a large fraction of the
population would strongly alter the presented picture. By
contrast, any mass vaccination campaign is unlikely to
start before the middle of October [45,46]. The potential
for an early activity peak of the pandemic in October/
November puts at risk the effectiveness of any mass vacci-
nation program that might take place too late with respect
to the pandemic wave in the Northern hemisphere. In this
case it is natural to imagine the use of other mitigation
strategies aimed at delaying the activity peak so that the
maximum benefit can be gained with the vaccination pro-
gram. As an example, we studied the implementation of
systematic antiviral (AV) treatment and its effect in delay-
ing the activity peak [19,30,32,39,47-50]. The resulting
effects are clearly country specific in that each country will
experience a different timing for the epidemic peak (with
a local transmissibility increasing in value as we approach
the winter months) and will count on antiviral stockpiles
of different sizes. Here we consider the implementation of
the AV treatment in all countries in the world that have
Table 4: Daily new number of cases and epidemic sizes in several countries
Country Peak time New daily cases at the 
peak time (thousands)
New daily cases at the 
peak time 
(% of population)
Epidemic size at 15 October 
(% of population)
αmin 0.6 αmin 0.7
United States 24 September to 9 
November
2,983 to 3,302 1.06 to 1.17 4.99 to 7.38 23.76 to 29.96
Canada 4 October to 14 
November
331 to 373 1.04 to 1.17 2.28 to 4.56 16.90 to 27.41
United Kingdom 9 October to 18 
November
723 to 813 1.21 to 1.36 1.77 to 4.45 11.11 to 27.29
France 12 October to 21 
November
725 to 792 1.26 to 1.38 1.83 to 3.87 10.86 to 26.40
Germany 11 October to 20 
November
1,162 to 1,291 1.43 to 1.59 1.02 to 2.41 8.57 to 26.25
Italy 17 October to 23 
November
793 to 867 1.39 to 1.52 0.93 to 2.20 6.71 to 22.13
Spain 8 October to 19 
November
492 to 536 1.23 to 1.34 2.39 to 3.70 13.26 to 27.95
China 8 November to 11 
December
14,077 to 16,207 1.16 to 1.34 0.65 to 5.34 1.51 to 9.49
Japan 13 October to 16 
November
1,539 to 1,822 1.21 to 1.43 1.47 to 4.86 5.84 to 24.65
Peak times of the epidemic activity, daily new number of cases predicted at peak time and % of the population, and epidemic size on 15 October are 
shown. Intervals refer to the 95% confidence interval (CI). After 1 year from the start of the epidemic the percentage of total population infected is 
close to 45% with small differences of the order of 5% across different countries.
Table 5: Number of hospitalizations per 100,000 persons at the activity peak in several countries
HR based on seasonal influenza, 0.08% HR based on multiplier method HR based on WHO confirmed cases, 10%
0.3% 1%
USA 2.21 8.28 27.58 275.84
Canada 2.18 8.17 27.22 272.23
UK 2.52 9.45 31.52 315.15
France 2.61 9.79 32.64 326.40
Germany 2.98 11.17 37.22 372.18
Italy 2.87 10.76 35.87 358.67
Spain 2.54 9.54 31.81 318.12
China 2.48 9.32 31.05 310.50
Japan 2.59 9.70 32.32 323.19
The estimates are obtained by considering three methods. The first assumes the average hospitalization rate (HR) observed during the seasonal 
influenza season. The second is a simple multiplier method in which the HR is obtained as the ratio between the World Health organization 
(WHO) number of confirmed hospitalizations and the cases confirmed by the WHO multiplied by a factor 10 to 30 to account for underreporting. 
The third method is simply the ratio of the total number of confirmed hospitalizations and the total number of confirmed cases.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:45 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/45
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drugs stockpiles available (source data from [51,52] and
national agencies), until the exhaustion of their stockpiles
[4]. We have modeled this mitigation policy with a con-
servative therapeutic successful use of drugs for 30% of
symptomatic infectious individuals. The efficacy of the AV
is accounted in the model by a 62% reduction in the trans-
missibility of the disease of an infected person under AV
treatment when AV drugs are administered in a timely
fashion [30,32]. We assume that the drugs are adminis-
tered within 1 day of the onset of symptoms. We also con-
sider that the AV treatment reduces the infectious period
by 1 day [30,32]. In Figure 3 we show the delay obtained
with the implementation of the AV treatment protocol in
a subset of countries with available stockpiles. As an
example, we also show the incidence profiles for the cases
of Spain and Germany, where it is possible to achieve a
delay of about 4 weeks with the use of 5 million and 10
million courses of AV, respectively. The results of this mit-
igation might be extremely valuable in providing the nec-
essary time for the implementation of the mass
vaccination program.
Conclusion
We have defined a Monte Carlo likelihood analysis for the
assessment of the seasonal transmission potential of the
new A(H1N1) influenza based on the analysis of the chro-
nology of case detection in affected countries at the early
stage of the epidemic. This method allows the use of data
coming from the border controls and the enhanced sur-
veillance aimed at detecting the first cases reaching unin-
fected countries. This data is, in principle, more reliable
than the raw count of cases provided by countries during
the evolution of the epidemic. The procedure provides the
necessary input to the large-scale computational model
for the analysis of the unfolding of the pandemic in the
future months. The analysis shows the potential for an
early activity peak that strongly emphasizes the need for
detailed planning for additional intervention measures,
such as social distancing and antiviral drugs use, to delay
the epidemic activity peak and thus increase the effective-
ness of the subsequent vaccination effort.
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